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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Romanian National Bank officially adopted the inflation targeting 
monetary strategy in august 2005. This is considered by litearture as a flexible 
framework capable to offer the Central Bank a „constricted discretionarism” in 
performing a role where the nominal anchor is the inflation target. Also, this has been 
seen as the strategy where the monetary policy is connected to the long and medium 
time horizon without siminishing its ability of reacting to short term developments. 
Thus, inflation achieves a conciliation between the responsability imposed by the 
reigide rules, on one and, and the flexibility allowed by the discretionary aproach, on 
the other hand. These are the essential hypothesis of the Romanian National Bank in 
instating and applying the actual monetary policy strategy. vThe choice and guiding of 
the monetary policy regime depends on few basic principles. Two of these principles 
refer to money neutrality and, further more to the independence in policy making 
decisions. The core concept launched by Friedman (1968) is that, on a long term, there 
is no compromise between inflation and un-employment, due to the fact that money is neutral. The second principle states the fact that monetary policy strategy and 
management could, on the other hand, exploit the inverse short term relation between 
the inflation rate and the un-employment rate. These are the basic priciples apliable by 
any national bank. Further constraints for Romania come from the EMU enlargement 
process under the restrictions of the „no-opt-out clause”, and the recent economic and 
financial crises. The questiones raised by this study is whether the monetary regime 
choice is performing, not only under normal economic circumstances, but also under 




From the EMU enlargement point of view, the choice of the monetary regime 
has been free as long as convergence is considered an aim for monetary evolutions. At 
the same time, the Euro accession timetable is envisaged due to the evolution in the 
fulfilment of the convergence criteria.  Aspiring EMU candidates have used very 
different monetary and exchange rate regimes, covering practically the whole spectrum 
from rigidly fixed to free floating exchange rate arrangements, from currency boards to 
inflation targetting. Among the Central and East European accession candidates, three 
have a currency board (Bulgaria and Estonia with respect to the euro, Lithuania 
originally with respect to the USD, changed to the euro on February 2, 2002), Latvia 
has a conventional fixed exchange rate regime with a peg, Hungary a target zone with a 
central rate fixed against the euro and a 15% fluctuation band plus an inflation target. 
The remaining five countries have a managed float. Managed floats cover a wide 
spectrum of possibilities as regards the ultimate nominal anchor. Among the five 
managed floaters, the Slovak Republic has a core inflation target, Poland and the Czech 
Republic have headline inflation targets. The Romanian central bank had price stability 
as its primary mandate, and has converted it into an inflation target. 
Since 2005 the Romanian National Bank chose the inflation targeting as 
strategy of the monetary policy after several years of targeting monetary aggregates.  
The broadest definition of inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework 
that accords overriding importance to the maintenance of price stability. The narrower 
definition says that inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework based on the 
adoption of a monetary policy rule in which forecasts of future inflation play a central 
role, either in the form of instrument rules or of target rules. An instrument rule 
expresses the monetary policy instrument as a simple and usually linear function of 
deviation of a few key macroeconomic variables from their target level. A target rule 
expresses the monetary policy instrument as the solution to an optimization problem 
defined by a loss function describing the costs associated with deviations of specific 
goal variables from their target levels subject to the constraints imposed by the model 
of the economy’s structure (Daianu 2008). 
The strongest logic of the inflation targeting regime is that under some 
reasonable conditions stabilization of prices is equivalent to the stabilization of output 
around its natural level – that is, the level of output that would prevail if there were no 
nominal rigidities (Blanchard, 2003). Nevertheless, inflation targeting is faced with 
several restrictions. At least three of them have been depicted from specialized 
literature, and treated as basic assumptions (Daianu 2008).   
The first one is according to Aoki (2001) is the assumption of no schocks that 
would require the relative price of any good to vary over time in an efficient 
equilibrium. Price stability maintenance is not optimal under the conditions of relative 
price change in an efficient resource allocation due to asymmetric shock effects.  
The second one, comes from the sticky price area (Christiano et al., 2001), but 
refering to the flexibility of wages. In real economy, that might not be valid, due to the 
fact that if both wages and prices are sticky with price stabilization, the real wage will 
be frequently misaligned, as will be the relative wages of different types of labor if 
these are not set in perfect synchronization.  
The third assumption is the lack of market power and distorting taxes, meaning, 
as a consequence, that it will not be possible to simultaneously stabilize inflation and 
the welfare relevant output gap (Daianu 2008).  
All these strengthen the controversy around inflation targeting as the ideal 
monetary policy strategy. Even as far as price stability is concerned there are no success 
guarantees for neither of the options. Close attention and good track of actual economic 
conditions could provide a correct and suitable connection to monetary aims.  
The Romanian National Bank officially adopted the inflation targeting 
monetary strategy in august 2005. This is considered by literature as a flexible 
framework capable to offer the Central Bank a „constricted discretionarism” in 
performing a role where the nominal anchor is the inflation target. Also, this has been 
seen as the strategy where the monetary policy is connected to the long and medium 
time horizon without diminishing its ability of reacting to short term developments. 
Thus, inflation achieves conciliation between the responsibility imposed by the rigid 
rules, on one hand, and the flexibility allowed by the discretionary approach, on the 
other hand. These are the essential hypothesis of the Romanian National Bank in 
instating and applying the actual monetary policy strategy. 
One certain aspect is that, as previously demonstrated by other central and 
eastern European countries implementing inflation targeting, this choice moves 
inflation expectations down gradually. Also, during last few years since its 
implementation and to the economic crises, inflation targetting has provided a smooth 
transition, even disinflationary. Implementing inflation targeting is a rather challenging 
job and requires a very solid approach and understanding of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism based on the monetary structure of an economy. The monetary 
economy in Romania has been characterized by certain features of its main 
components: 
‐  The banking sector holds a rater low rate of the GDP compared to other 
economies even if it ranges beyond 50% of GDP; there a few large banks 
operating and thus, their market power actions in a different direction upon 
the monetary power of the NBR over the banking liquidity. This is rather an 
oligopoly state for the Romanian Banking system. 
‐  The level of monetization has been low, both before and during the 
financial crises 
‐  An increasing euroization of the Romanian economy due to the eve-lasting 
inflationary issue in Romania. Recent literature on financial crises focuses 
on the other side of private agents’ balance sheets and puts forward 
financial risks associated with liability dollarization, for example a situation 
where private and public debts are denominated in a foreign currency. As 
compared to currency substitution (asset dollarization), this is quite a different perspective on dollarization (euroization) and must be explicitly 
dealt with (Reinhart et al., 2003). Various risks indeed may be connected to 
a significant dollar debt, in particular if the international value of the local 
currency can slide down. (Daianu 2008). 
‐  The illegal sector is yet another constraint of the monetary policy choice 
regime for Romania due to the lack of control power. The larger the so-
called “informal sector” the larger the money demand. 
‐  Literature has denominated the size of the economy as another element to 
be considering when discussing monetary regimes. Romania is a rather 
small economy, an open one, where the exchange rate is by far the most 
important channel for monetary policy transmission. The openness degree 
depicted in the share of trade in the GDP has ranged from around 28% to 
40% with certain variation from the beginning of the economic crises. 
‐  Timing of the capital account liberalization – which the NBR has been 
forced to postpone due to the fact that a premature opening of the capital 
account could translate into a financial turmoil if other macroeconomic 
criteria are not met first (Daianu and Vranceanu, 2003). That turn has been 
even though taken and capital account liberalization and significant capital 
inflows further potentiated the effects of the economic crises.   
Policy regime choices & constraints for Romania could have been resumed as 
following (According to the National Bank of Romania): 
‐  The need for further sustainable disinflation, including from EU 
convergence perspective; move from 8.5% to around 2-3% difficult, 
fraught with costs (non-linear sacrifice ratio, etc.) 
‐  Status quo (mix of monetary targeting with exchange rate interventions) no 
longer appropriate: weakening relationship between monetary aggregates 
and inflation 
‐  Exchange-rate peg based regime highly risky in light of convergence 
induced appreciation trend, move towards full capital mobility 
‐  Inflation targeting provides CB transparency & accountability, constrained 
discretion, should help anchor expectations, dominates above options in 
terms of robustness to shocks; but requires time for full effectiveness 
As these and other more represent the constrains for Romania in dealing with 
inflation targeting regime,  
  The final choice in inflation targeting regime in Romania has the folowing 
features (according to the NBR): 
‐  CPI-based inflation target 
‐  Target set as a midpoint within a band of ±1 percentage points- annual 
targets set for a longer time horizon (initially 2 years) 
‐  Flexible interpretation of inflation targeting (mainly its co-existence with 
managed float) 
‐  Joint announcement of inflation targets by the NBR and the government 
NBR pro-active stance & transparency: decisions based on 8 quarters ahead 
inflation forecasts, detailed risk analysis in quarterly inflation reports, pre-announced 
policy meetings followed by statements, analyst meetings, press conferences. 
In terms of actual performance of inflation targeting regime in Romania, data 
provided by the National Bank of Romania concerning inflation evolution and forecast 
represent a starting point for discussion.  
At end-2009, the 12-month CPI inflation rate went down to 4.74 percent, i.e. 
0.24 percentage points above the upper limit of the 3.5±1 percent variation band and 0.2 
percentage points below the September reading of 4.94 percent. The persistent negative 
GDP gap and the leu exchange rate dynamics were conducive to the decline in 
consumer price inflation. Nevertheless, their contribution was largely offset by the 
adverse impact of supply-side factors, and particularly by the hikes in excise duties on 
tobacco products. Throughout 2009, the prices of tobacco products contributed by more 
than one third to the annual expansion in consumer prices, following the successive 
increases in excise duties. In 2009 Q4, the rapid rise in such prices was generated by 
producers’ earlier incorporation into prices of the new exchange rate that was to be 
used, starting January 2010, for calculating excise duties (the increase in the EUR-
denominated excise duty is estimated to be incorporated in consumer prices at the 
beginning of 2010). By contrast, the annual dynamics of adjusted CORE2 inflation, 
which responds more accurately to aggregate demand management, decreased 
September through December 2009 by 1.4 percentage points to 2.8 percent2. Behind 
the deceleration in adjusted CORE2 inflation stood the disinflationary pressures arising 
from falling demand, softer depreciation of the domestic currency in annual terms, 
absence of negative supply-side shocks from the agricultural sector in 2009 and 




CORE2 Annual inflation (procentage change) 
 
For 2011, the current projection anticipates a consumer price inflation 
trajectory largely in line with that presented in the previous Inflation Report. A 
marginally unfavorable contribution will be generated towards the end of the projection 
horizon by the incorporation of higher increases in administered prices into the current 
baseline scenario. (NBR - Inflation Report , February 2010). 
Actually, the major challenge is to both settle the need to consolidate 
disinflation and, on the other hand, to limit the actual ever-growing budget deficit. Once 
the capital acount has been opened, this task becomes even more difficult. Even if the 
actual one is not an acurately tailored one, a real reforme of public expenditure is 
necessaryand mush needed by the monetary economy in Romania, and by the economy 
as a whole. This would help settleing the confrontation between a restrictive monetary 
policy and the budget deficit. The policy-mix including the monetary policy, the budget 
policy and furthermore should also be able to overcome the international financial 
crisis.  These financial turbulences ask for more prudence on the part of national policy 
makers, especially where external deficits are pretty large and inflation is still high. Romanian budget policy would be imprudent were it to target larger budget deficits in 
the years to come –under the circumstances of still strong tensions on world financial 
markets. 
One must not forget, once more, of the restrictions imposed by the multilateral 
external financing arrangement signed by Romania with the EU, the IMF and other 
international financial institutions, on the one hand, and the absence of any significant 
deviations from the forecast assumptions regarding the impact of exogenous factors and 




No monetary policy choice guarantees success or the fulfillment of monetary 
objectives unless correctly implemented and timed, according to the structure of the 
monetary economy.  Romania’s actual inflation targeting monetary strategies has 
performed rather well on a monetary level, anyway better than the rest of the economic 
policies. The economic and financial crisis has pointed out the vulnerabilities of the 
Romanian economy, and of the monetary side in particular. Even more challenges are 
to come as part of the external financing granted to Romania by the IMF and other 
monetary institutions envisaging supporting the budget deficit. These financial 
turbulences ask for more prudence on the part of national policy makers, especially 
where external deficits are pretty large and inflation is still high. The monetary policy 
stance is expected to remain prudent, aiming to avoid potential second-round effects of 
adverse exogenous shocks expected for 2010 Q1. Even more, a balanced adjustment of 
real monetary conditions is needed in order to stabilize inflation around the initial 
targets and also to support lending.  
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